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IN THEIR DISPUTES with Japan, U.S. trade  negotiators  have increasingly 
concentrated  on deeply rooted structural  aspects of the Japanese  econ- 
omy. In the recent structural  impediments  initiative  (SII), for example, 
the U.S. government  argued  for increased  antitrust  enforcement,  and, 
in particular,  for increased  policing  of Japanese  corporate  groups  known 
as keiretsu.  Thejoint  report  issued  at  the conclusion  of the SII  recognized 
that "certain aspects of economic rationality  of Keiretsu  relationships 
notwithstanding,  there  is a view that  certain  aspects of Keiretsu  relation- 
ships also promote preferential  group trade, negatively affect foreign 
direct  investment  in  Japan,  and  may  give rise  to anticompetitive  business 
practices.  "' In response to the SII, the government  of Japan  agreed  to 
strengthen  its Fair  Trade  Commission's  (FTC)  monitoring  of transactions 
among  keiretsu  firms  and to take the necessary steps toward  eliminating 
any restraints on competition that might arise from their business 
practices. 
This paper reflects work in progress on my study "First Among Equals: U.S. 
Manufacturing  in a Global Economy," funded  by the Ford Foundation.  I am indebted 
to Kashif Mansori for superb research assistance and to Peter Petri for generously 
providing  data. I thank  Evelyn Taylor  for text processing  and am grateful  for comments 
received  from Anne Krueger,  Yoshiyuki  Noguchi, Sylvia Ostry, Gary Saxonhouse,  T. 
N.  Srinivasan,  Nobuaki Takahashi,  and participants  in conferences sponsored by (1) 
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1. U.S. and  Japanese  Governments  (1990,  p. V-1). 
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Keiretsu  are  groups  of firms  characterized  by close business relations 
and long-term  business commitments  among their members. Firms in 
these  groupings  are  attached  to one another  through  cross shareholdings, 
time-honored  buyer-supplier  arrangements,  interlocking  directorates, 
the interchange  of personnel among constituent companies, and the 
sharing  of information  concerning  product  development  and  distribution. 
How these ties bind  member  firms  together  varies  substantially  across 
keiretsu. Whether  they are horizontal  or vertical in structure  accounts 
for some of the variation. Horizontal keiretsu have a long history in 
Japan,  with three of the present  groups-Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and Sumi- 
tomo-having  grown out of the prewar  zaibatsu (industrial  combines); 
the other horizontal  keiretsu  have developed around  large banks. The 
horizontal  linkages  among  these industrial  groups  are far-flung,  stretch- 
ing  to almost  every corner  of the economy in an attempt  to achieve wide- 
scale diversification.  Firms  within  these keiretsu  can range  from  textiles 
to insurance,  auto production  to construction,  consumer  electronics to 
breweries. Horizontal  keiretsu  typically exhibit extensive cross share- 
holding-within keiretsu, aggregate  cross shareholding  ranges  from 12 
to 27 percent of total paid-up  capital-and  also engage in intragroup 
financing  by a common bank.2  Constituent  companies  also share  infor- 
mation, management  personnel, the use of trading  companies  for mar- 
keting  and  organizing  projects,  and  joint investment  in new industries. 
By contrast, vertical keiretsu have a tighter, more concentrated 
membership.  A manufacturing  concern stands  at the center  of a supply- 
distribution  network  and usually dominates  the other group members, 
who are made up of the main company's subsidiaries,  subcontractors, 
and important  customers. In these vertical  arrangements,  each member 
fulfills  a specific  function  and is fully integrated  into the production  and 
marketing  strategies of the core manufacturing  business. In addition, 
this form of corporate  architecture  is enhanced by long-term,  mutual 
agreements  concerning  supplier-buyer  relations, which operate  largely 
under  an unwritten,  intragroup  covenant. Examples of vertical groups 
include Nissan and Toyota in the auto industry,  Nippon Steel in metal 
production,  and Hitachi  and  Toshiba  in electronics. 
2. Nanto (1990,  p. 4). Use of the common  bank  is not exclusive. Member-companies 
typically  use the common  bank  for only a fraction  of their  financing  needs;  they also form 
ties with banks outside the group in order to spread risk and prevent one bank from 
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Difficulties  in Analyzing Keiretsu 
It should be stressed that the preceding description of keiretsu is 
general and simplistic. It is  hard to be  more detailed because the 
relationships  surrounding  keiretsu  are fluid  and ambiguous.  Indeed, the 
sundry  ways in which keiretsu  operate-among their  constituent  parts, 
toward other keiretsu groups, and toward companies outside their 
group-make  generalization  rather  treacherous. For example, the de- 
gree of closeness among  a single  keiretsu's  membership  can vary, as can 
the degree of closeness between keiretsu  members  and outside compa- 
nies that  are affiliated  with the keiretsu.  Within  the Mitsubishi  group,  for 
instance, cross shareholding  by individual  companies in 1988 ranged 
from 0.02 to 4.99 percent.3  Furthermore,  members  of vertical keiretsu 
often have loose  affiliations with horizontal keiretsu. Hitachi, for 
example, is associated with three horizontals. As a further compli- 
cation, member  companies  of keiretsu  can and do change affiliation  on 
occasion. 
Keiretsu  in the Japanese  and  World Economies 
The keiretsu  form  a significant  part  of the Japanese  economy. In 1985, 
17 of Japan's keiretsu, as defined by Dodwell Marketing  Consultants, 
accounted  for nearly  25 percent  of annual  sales in Japan,  with  Mitsubishi 
alone accounting  for almost  4 percent.4  The keiretsu  share  of net income 
is even larger;  they received around  32 percent of Japanese  net income 
in 1985.5  In addition,  the keiretsu  are significant  exporters;  their names 
have become household words around  the world-Mitsubishi, Mitsui, 
Sumitomo,  Hitachi, Nissan, Toyota, Toshiba, Matsushita,  and several 
others whose group names are less well known but whose member 
enterprises include Kawasaki, Sapporo Breweries, and Canon. In 
1985 the nine largest trading companies in Japan, all members of 
keiretsu, handled 44 percent of Japan's exports and 68 percent of 
Japan's  imports.6 
3.  Nanto (1990, p. 4). 
4.  Dodwell Marketing Consultants (1986, p. 37). 
5.  Dodwell Marketing Consultants (1986, p. 38). 
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Trade Positions  toward Keiretsu 
In  the American-Japanese  trade  debate  over  keiretsu  three  contrasting 
positions can be distinguished:  the benign neglect, trust busting, and 
dilemma positions. The first of these, benign neglect, contends that 
keiretsu do not have important  effects on Japanese economic perfor- 
mance.7  Evidence used to support  this view includes  Japanese  FTC  data 
showing that the intragroup  transactions  of keiretsu members are not 
particularly  large.  A 1981  study  found  that  within-group  transactions  for 
the six major  horizontal  groups  account  for only 11  percent  of their  sales 
and 12 percent of their purchases.8  Proponents of the benign neglect 
position also cite the low rates of return typically earned by large 
companies  that are keiretsu  members. Low returns,  it is argued, show 
that competitive pressures are strong.9  Finally, these observers cite 
studies  showing  that  Japanese  trade  patterns  can  be adequately  explained 
by other  economic variables,  such as factor  endowments.  10 
The second view, trust  busting,  takes a contrary  position. Its propo- 
nents maintain  that keiretsu create entry barriers  for newcomers and 
engage  in  anticompetitive  practices.  These analysts  seek stricter  antitrust 
enforcement  against  the keiretsu, not only by the Japanese  authorities 
but also by the U.S.  government. As Dick Nanto reports, the U.S. 
Justice  Department  is currently  deliberating  whether  to punish  antitrust 
violations by keiretsu in Japan by suing their U.S.  subsidiaries, and 
the U.S. Federal Trade Commission  has begun a probe of the actions 
7. According  to Komiya  (1990,  p. 186),  for example, "The three largest  keiretsu  not 
descended  from  the zaibatsu-have little  more  than  monthly  meetings  which  are  primarily 
of a social  nature,  with  little  functional  significance.  These  industrial  groups  are,  therefore, 
more  imaginary  than  real." 
8.  See Imai  (1990).  The data, however, have several problems.  Yamamura  (1990, p. 
31) notes that these measures  ignore secondary  and tertiary  suppliers;  Okumura  (1990) 
notes that the denominator  is inflated  by sales of trading  companies  which include  oil, 
gold,  and  foreign  trade  transactions;  and  Gerlach  (1989,  p. 156)  notes that  "in some sectors 
intra-keiretsu  transactions  actually  surpass  50 percent  of firms'  total  trade." 
9.  See Yoshitomi  (1990). However, low profits  could also indicate sheltered  ineffi- 
ciency. Caves  and  Uekusa  (1976,  p. 87)  found  that  profits  were negatively  related  to group 
affiliation  and concluded, "It remains distinctly possible that rents yielded by group 
affiliation  are  consumed  in technical  inefficiency." 
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of Japanese companies and their suppliers operating in the United 
States."  I 
The third  view, the dilemma  position, concedes that keiretsu  have a 
negative  impact  on Japanese  imports  and on the ability  of foreign  firms 
to enter  the Japanese  market,  but argues  that  keiretsu  have also been an 
important  reason  for  the superior  performance  of the Japanese  economy. 
Keiretsu  firms  constitute the Japanese  corporate  elite, and a keiretsu's 
linkages  are seen as providing  risk- and information-sharing  benefits  to 
its members.  Keiretsu may also serve as a more efficient substitute  for 
vertical  integration-permitting  reliable  supply  while preserving  corpo- 
rate flexibility.'2  Proponents  of this view see Japan  confronted  with a 
painful  trade-off  between openness and efficiency. One way to avoid 
this trade-off might be to incorporate  foreign firms into the keiretsu 
structure.  Indeed some see recent agreements  between Mitsubishi  and 
Daimler  Benz as an effort in this direction. A second way would be to 
manage trade with Japan in such a way that foreign firms are simply 
granted satisfactory market shares.'3  A possible third way would be 
foreign  direct  investment  by Japanese  firms.  A fourth  might  be to create 
a "level playing  field"  in which  foreign  firms  form  keiretsu  of their  own.  14 
Unfortunately,  too many  papers  on this topic marshal  data  to support 
a particular  view without  subjecting  them to tests of alternative  hypoth- 
eses. An exception, which explicitly investigates  the impact  of keiretsu 
on trade  behavior,  is by K. C. Fung.  15  He found  that  keiretsu  did have a 
negative  and statistically  significant  impact  on the U.S.-Japan  bilateral 
trade balance by industry, but the impact was small and the other 
variables  performed  poorly. The present  paper  aims to further  examine 
the effects of keiretsu  on trade. 
Investigating  the Effects of Keiretsu 
In what follows, I separately  test the impact of keiretsu  on exports 
and  imports.  If reduced  imports  are  statistically  associated  with  keiretsu, 
it could  be assumed  that  either  these groups  discriminate  against  foreign 
11. Nanto  (1990,  pp. 18-19). 
12. See Aoki (1984, 1990)  and  Yoshitomi  (1990). 
13. See Prestowitz  (1988). 
14. See Ferguson  (1990). 
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products, or all else being equal, they enhance the performance  of 
Japanese firms. Performance abroad, however, is less  likely to be 
influenced  by discriminatory  practices.16  Therefore,  if increased  exports 
are associated with keiretsu,  I assume that keiretsu  improve competi- 
tiveness. Thus, I can distinguish  between the three positions above. If 
keiretsu  have no effect on either imports  or exports, the benign  neglect 
position is supported.  If they reduce imports  but do not boost exports, 
the import-reducing  effect may reflect discrimination  against imports 
rather than increased efficiency. This finding  would thus support the 
trust-busting  view.  Finally, if keiretsu reduce imports and increase 
exports, this supports  the dilemma  position, because both these effects 
could be due to superior  efficiency. 
As emphasized  at the outset, one problem  in conducting  this investi- 
gation is  that keiretsu are not well defined. Because of this, many 
Japanese economists view the policy discussion on keiretsu as ill- 
informed. To get around this, I use data from a report prepared  by 
Dodwell Marketing  Consultants, which contains information  through 
1985 on individual firms and their keiretsu affiliations.17 Firms are 
classified  as either  unaffiliated  or belonging  to one of 17  major  industrial 
groups. Combining  this information  with data on sales by industry  in 
1985,  I have developed three variables.  The first (K) measures  the total 
share  of the 17  groups  in each industry's  sales. A second (Kh) measures 
the share of industry sales by the horizontal  groups."8  The third (K1) 
measures the share of industry  sales by the remaining  keiretsu, which 
are primarily  vertical.  19 
Empirical Model 
My empirical  model builds on an extremely useful paper by Peter 
Petri, which explains, across Japanese  industries,  the share of imports 
in domestic consumption  and the share of exports in world markets.20 
16. This becomes less true as Japanese  firms increase their foreign presence. See 
Kreinen  (1988). 
17. Dodwell  Marketing  Consultants  (1986). 
18. In  the  empirical  analysis,  the  horizontal  keiretsu  are  Mitsubishi,  Mitsui,  Sumitomo, 
Fuyo, DKB, Sanwa,  Tokai,  and  Industrial  Bank  of Japan. 
19. The verticals are Nippon Steel, Hitachi, Nissan, Toyota, Matsushita,  Toshiba, 
Tokyu, Seibu  Railway,  and  Seibu  Saison. 
20. Petri  (1989). Robert Z.  Lawrence  317 
Table 1.  Variables Used in Import and Export Equations 
Import  penetration:  Ratio of imports  to domestic demand  by industry. 
Share of world exports: Ratio of Japanese exports to total world exports by 
industry. 
Raw material  intensity:  Share of mining,  refinery  products, electricity, and gas 
in sectoral  production  costs.a 
Capital  intensity:  Share of operating  surplus  plus depreciation  in sectoral value 
added.a 
Technological  intensity:  Share  of scientists  and  engineers  in sectoral  employment.a 
Government:  Share of government,  government  investment,  public enterprises, 
and research  institutes  in purchases  of the sector's products.a 
Personal  consumption:  Share  of households  in purchases  of the sector's product.a 
Transportation costs:  Ratio of weight to value.b 
Tariffs:  Total tariffs  levied as a percent  of value.a 
Producer  concentration:  Herfindahl  index of supply concentration  for 1986.c 
Keiretsu sales, K: Share of industry  sales reported  by Dodwell made by firms 
affiliated  with one of the 17 broadly  defined  keiretsu  in 1985. 
Horizontal  keiretsu sales,  Kh: Share  of industry  sales by 8 horizontal  keiretsu in 
1985. 
Vertical keiretsu sales,  K,: Share of industry sales by 9 vertical keiretsu in 1985. 
Sources:  Keiretsi  sales data are from Dodwell  Marketing Consultants (1986); all other variables are from Petri 
(1989). 
a.  Shares are derived from the  1985 input-output table in Petri (1989). 
b.  Share is derived from U.S.  trade statistics. 
c.  Producer concentration  is an index,  not a percentage. 
As reported  in table 1  of this paper,  Petri  uses traditional  variables  in his 
analysis-measures  for factor intensity, industrial  organization, and 
protection-and also includes  variables  indicating  margins  in the distri- 
bution  sector and  the relative  importance  of consumers  and  the govern- 
ment  as final  buyers.2' 
Petri  found, among  other results, that import  penetration  was nega- 
tively related  to distribution  margins,  and concluded  that the Japanese 
distribution  system acts as a barrier  against  imports.  He also found  that 
markets  in which household purchases accounted for a large share of 
sales had a relatively  high  import  penetration  ratio. Petri  estimated  that 
if the Japanese  government  and Japanese business behaved like con- 
sumers,  imports  of manufactured  goods might  double.22 
21. See Petri  (1989)  for an excellent discussion  of the theoretical  basis of this factor- 
intensity  model. 
22. There  is a statistically  significant  positive  correlation  of 0.35 between  the relative 
importance  of keiretsu  sales, K, and  the measure  of the importance  of sales to businesses 
developed by Petri. This indicates that keiretsu  linkages  are associated with producer 
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The available  data, up through  1985,  allow an estimation  of the share 
of sales by keiretsu  members  for 38 of the 49 industries  in Petri's  original 
sample.  There  are, however, strong  reasons to believe that  the behavior 
of the aircraft  industry  has been heavily influenced  by unusual  historical 
and political factors. In 1985 this sector imported 39 percent of its 
consumption, a figure almost four times as high as the next biggest 
importing  sector and over ten times higher  than the sample mean of a 
little more  than  3 percent.  As might  be expected, the inclusion  of aircraft 
has a big effect on the estimated coefficients that explain imports- 
particularly  on the capital-intensity  and  technology-intensity  variables.23 
Accordingly,  the regressions  reported  in table 2, which explain  imports 
using  the variables  developed  by Petri, exclude aircraft  from  the sample 
and are based on observations  for 37 industries. 
Effect  of Keiretsu on Imports 
When import  equations  are estimated  over the smaller  sample  using 
Petri's data and ordinary least squares, most of Petri's findings are 
qualitatively  confirmed,  although  the statistical  significance  of some of 
the variables is lower.24  As shown in equation 2.1, Japanese imports 
tend to be intensive in raw materials  and  technology  but not necessarily 
in capital.  They are  negatively  related  to the share  of government  in total 
demand and to transportation  costs  (though not significantly), and 
positively related  to producer  concentration. 
When  the regression  is reestimated  adding  the keiretsu  variable,  K in 
equation 2.2,  its explanatory power is  considerably improved: the 
adjusted  R2 rises from 0.29 to 0.45. The coefficient on the variable  is 
negative and statistically  significant,  and the t-statistics  on most of the 
other  variables  also increase.  Pared-down  versions  of the regression  and 
alternative  sample specifications  (neither  of which are reported  here) 
were also estimated.  The degree  to which the keiretsu  variable  contrib- 
utes to the explanatory  power of the regressions, its statistical signifi- 
cance, and  its negative  sign all appear  robust.25 
23. When  a dummy  variable  for aircraft  is included  together  with data  on the aircraft 
industry  in the regressions  in table  2, the dummy  has a t-statistic  of 8.8. 
24. Petri  obtained  statistically  significant  effects from his variables  measuring  distri- 
bution  margins  and  the square  of technology.  These were  not statistically  significant  in the 
regressions  here  and  have been dropped  from  the specifications  reported  in table  2. 
25. However,  the  share  of sales  by  keiretsu  members  in  the  aircraft  industry  is extremely 
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Table 2.  Equations Modeling Japanese Imports by Industry,  1985 
Import penetration 
Independent  variable  2.1  2.2  2.3  2.4  2.5 
Constant  1.10  3.32  2.32  1.40  3.39 
(0.59)  (1.82)  (1.24)  (0.73)  (1.83) 
Raw material  intensity  0.20  0.26  0.24  0.21  0.26 
(1.64)  (2.35)  (2.05)  (1.67)  (2.35) 
Capital  intensity  -0.07  -0.04  -0.06  -0.07  -0.05 
(1.70)  (1.17)  (1.55)  (1.53)  (1.17) 
Technological  intensity  0.44  0.46  0.44  0.45  0.45 
(2.81)  (3.31)  (3.00)  (2.87)  (3.23) 
Government  share  -0.04  -0.03  -0.06  -0.03  -0.04 
of demand  (1.31)  (1.02)  (1.88)  (0.80)  (1.17) 
Consumer  share  0.03  -0.01  - 0.01  0.03  -0.02 
of demand  (0.83)  (0.35)  (0.25)  (0.89)  (0.52) 
Transportation  cost  - 0.35  -0.39  -0.15  -0.47  - 0.32 
(0.63)  (0.79)  (0.28)  (0.81)  (0.62) 
Tariffs  0.22  0.22  0.29  0.19  0.25 
(1.41)  (1.64)  (1.93)  (1.17)  (1.72) 
Producer  concentration  0.0008  0.0008  0.0010  0.0007  0.0009 
(1.51)  (1.75)  (1.97)  (1.31)  (1.82) 
Keiretsu  sales  (K)  ...  -0.056  ...  ... 
(2.99) 
Horizontal  keiretsu  ...  ...  -0.046  ...  -0.063 
sales (Kh)  (2.11)  (2.83) 
Vertical  keiretsu  ...  ...  ...  -  0.023  -  0.048 
sales (K,,)  (0.93)  (2.03) 
Summary statistic 
R  2  0.29  0.45  0.37  0.29  0.43 
Standard  error  2.46  2.17  2.32  2.47  2.20 
F-statistic  2.84  4.23  3.33  2.60  3.75 
Sources:  See  table  I for sources  and description  of variables.  Numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics.  The critical 
values  for the t-statistics  are t >  1.31, significant at the 90 percent  level,  and t >  1.70, significant at the 95 percent 
level. 
The keiretsu  variable  in the import  equation  is not only statistically 
significant  but, unlike the estimates of Fung, is also quantitatively 
important.26  If the variable  were set at zero in equation  2.2, the overall 
value of imports  for the industries  in the sample  would be $58.8 billion 
rather  than their predicted  value of $28.2 billion in 1985. Of course, if 
share, are used in the regression,  the coefficient  on K remains  negative  but is no longer 
statistically  significant. 
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these import-reducing  effects were actually  eliminated,  given Japanese 
saving and investment behavior, the yen would depreciate and offset 
some of the impact  of this change. Overall,  therefore,  the impact  would 
be smaller  than  the difference  between $58.8 and $28.2 billion. 
Table 2 also reports regressions in which the keiretsu variable is 
divided according to whether the group is horizontally or vertically 
shaped. When  estimated  simultaneously  (equation  2.5), the coefficients 
on each variable are similar in magnitude  and both are statistically 
significant.  Thus, both types of keiretsu are associated with quantita- 
tively important  reductions  in imports.27 
On balance,  these results  do not appear  to reflect  reverse  causation- 
that  low import  shares  lead  to the  formation  of the  keiretsu-they actually 
seem to suggest the reverse. In fact, imports are not particularly  low 
when  keiretsu  sales are  high.  The  correlation  coefficients  between  import 
shares and the horizontal and vertical keiretsu  variables (-0.11  and 
-0.26  respectively) are not statistically significant.  Rather, it is only 
after controlling  for the other variables in the import regression that 
there  is a significant  negative  association  between import  shares  and  the 
three keiretsu  variables. 
Effect  of Keiretsu on Exports 
The model  is applied  to explain  Japanese  export  performance  in table 
3. As can be seen from equation 3.1, which does not yet include the 
keiretsu  variables,  Japanese  exports do not tend to be intensive in raw 
materials  (although  the coefficient is not statistically significant).  The 
positive coefficient  on the technology-intensity  variable  and  the negative 
coefficient on the square of this variable suggest that Japan's export 
strength  lies in medium-tech  products. Japan  also tends to have higher 
exports in industries  with a high degree of producer  concentration.  As 
with imports,  capital  intensity  does not contribute  to the explanation. 
However, in the case of exports, inclusion of the keiretsu variable 
brings  no additional  explanatory  power (equation  3.2). The coefficient 
is not statistically  different  from zero, and the equation including  this 
variable  has  a higher  standard  error  (and  does nothing  to raise  the  R2)  than 
27. When the horizontal  variable  is split into two variables-the  sales of the three 
former zaibatsu (Mitsubishi,  Mitsui, and Sumitomo)  and those of the remaining  five 
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Table 3.  Equations Modeling Japanese Exports by Industry,  1985 
Share of world exports 
Independent  variable  3.1  3.2  3.3  3.4  3.5 
Constant  -  1.70  - 3.92  - 0.59  - 3.32  - 3.42 
(0.22)  (0.47)  (0.07)  (0.43)  (0.42) 
Raw material  intensity  - 0.55  - 0.69  -0.47  -0.63  -0.64 
(1.07)  (1.27)  (0.87)  (1.26)  (1.19) 
Capital  intensity  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.03  0.03 
(0.22)  (0.17)  (0.23)  (0.19)  (0.19) 
Technological  intensity  5.69  5.15  5.65  4.27  4.26 
(2.26)  (1.98)  (2.22)  (1.67)  (1.62) 
Technological  intensity  - 0.53  -0.49  - 0.52  -0.39  -0.39 
squared  (2.18)  (1.96)  (2.11)  (1.57)  (1.54) 
Transportation  cost  0.22  0.37  0.38  1.11  1.10 
(0.09)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.46)  (0.45) 
Producer  concentration  0.0043  0.0045  0.0044  0.0051  0.0051 
(2.02)  (2.10)  (2.03)  (2.40)  (2.36) 
Keiretsu  sales  (K)  ...  0.069  ...  ...  ... 
(0.84) 
Horizontal  keiretsu  ...  ...  -  0.050  ...  0.004 
sales (Kh)  (0.56)  (0.04) 
Vertical keiretsu  . . .  ...  . ..  0.168  0.169 
sales (K,)  (1.74)  (1.61) 
Summary statistic 
R2  0.23  0.23  0.22  0.28  0.26 
Standard  error  10.71  10.76  10.83  10.37  10.55 
F-statistic  2.82  2.50  2.41  3.01  2.55 
Sources:  See  table  I for sources  and description  of variables.  Numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics.  The critical 
values  for the t-statistics  are t >  1.31, significant at the 90 percent level,  and t >  1.70, significant at the 95 percent 
level. 
when it is excluded.28  When  the variable  is split into the horizontal  and 
vertical  groups, the results are interesting.  The horizontal  keiretsu  are 
not associated  with higher  export shares  (equation  3.3), while there is a 
positive association between the vertical keiretsu and export perfor- 
mance (equation  3.4). The t-statistic  indicates, however, that the coef- 
ficient on Kv  is not statistically  different  from zero at the 97.5 percent 
level. Nonetheless, it is significant  at the 90 percent  level. 
28. Following  Petri,  I also tried  a seemingly  unrelated  regression  technique  to estimate 
the import  and  export  equations  simultaneously.  Once  aircraft  are  excluded,  however,  the 
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In sum, horizontal  keiretsu  are  associated  with a significant  reduction 
in imports  but have no effect on exports-a  result supporting  the trust- 
busting position. By contrast, vertical keiretsu are associated with a 
significant  reduction in imports and a positive, moderately  significant 
effect on exports. This export  result  provides  some weak support  for the 
dilemma  position  when  vertical  keiretsu  alone  are  considered:  it  indicates 
that there may be some efficiency gains resulting from this type of 
keiretsu.29 
Recent  Changes  in Trade Performance 
Unfortunately,  it has not been possible to assemble a complete set of 
data on recent shares  of imports  by industry.  However, data on import 
growth by industry  over the period 1985-88 are available. Regressing 
the growth in the share of imports  between 1985  and 1988  against the 
levels of the variables  in 1985  provides  a test of whether  the coefficients 
on the variables have changed between 1985 and 1988. These tests, 
which are not reported here, suggest that over the period no change 
occurred in the effects of horizontal  keiretsu on imports;  but they do 
provide  some evidence that the import-reducing  effects associated  with 
the vertical keiretsu were declining.30  These regressions also indicate 
that Japanese imports were becoming more capital intensive and less 
technologically  intensive. 
Importance of Empirical Analysis 
Keiretsu may be associated with lower imports across Japanese 
industries,  but  in principle  this need not imply  that  Japanese  markets  are 
more closed than those in other countries. In other countries  different 
institutional  arrangements  could be discouraging  imports to a similar 
degree. 
Studies of whether Japanese markets are more closed than others 
have reached different  conclusions. Some find that fundamental  eco- 
nomic variables,  such as factor  endowments,  gross national  output,  and 
29. This  result  could  also support  the view that  protected  home  markets  help  subsidize 
and  promote  exports. For  further  discussion,  see Krugman  (1984). 
30. It should  be noted that the evidence for this effect is rather  mild. The estimated 
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geographic  distance  from  major  trading  partners,  explain  Japanese  trade 
as well as they explain  the trade  of other  countries.  The authors  of these 
studies interpret  their results as evidence that the Japanese market  is 
not unusually protected.3' Other studies, however, have found that 
Japanese imports are unusually low.32  T. N.  Srinivasan and Koichi 
Hamada have appraised most of the studies and criticized them for 
methodological  weaknesses.3 
Many  of the studies  presume  that  import  equations  in a cross-country 
sample  can test for the distinctiveness  of Japanese  trade  patterns.  Their 
fundamental  weakness is that they fail to model the (alleged)  Japanese 
import  barriers  explicitly. Even where they do find  that Japanese  trade 
patterns are different, they cannot distinguish  between the effects of 
different  preferences  and the effects of barriers  to Japanese  exports or 
imports. To obtain more persuasive results, it is necessary to provide 
explicit proxies for specific barriers. I do this by using the data on 
keiretsu. 
In an earlier study of OECD countries, I estimated the "normal" 
import  share  for an industry  in 1983  given that  industry's  share  in OECD 
exports.  Using  these shares  together  with  distance  variables,  I estimated, 
for each Japanese  industry,  the degree to which its imports  relative to 
consumption differed from the predicted share estimated across all 
OECD countries.34  In order to determine  whether keiretsu  have influ- 
enced the results  for Japan,  I regressed  the difference  between  the actual 
and predicted import share (D) for each Japanese industry on the 
appropriate  keiretsu  variable  for that industry,  Kh and K.3s The results 
are  presented  below. 
(1)  Dh  =  1.67 +  0.014Kh 
(3.63)  (1.43) 
R2 =  0.14 
(2)  Dv = 0.70  -  0.018K1, 
(3.00)  (2.22) 
R2 =  0.28 
31. Such studies include Bergsten  and Cline (1987), Saxonhouse (1986, 1989),  and 
Leamer  (1987). 
32. Balassa  and  Noland  (1988),  Lawrence  (1987),  and  Lincoln  (1990). 
33. Srinivasan  and  Hamada  (1990). 
34. Imports  lower than (higher  than) predicted  were given by a negative (positive) 
coefficient  on a dummy  variable  for Japan  in the cross-country  regression. 
35. For  details  concerning  the estimation  technique  and  results,  see Lawrence  (1987). 324  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
The horizontal keiretsu in equation 1 get a positive, though not 
significant,  coefficient indicating,  if anything, that they are associated 
with unusually high import levels. This could indicate that they are 
inefficient.  However, I would conjecture  that this result indicates that 
they are associated  with  raw  materials  imports  from  foreign  subsidiaries 
of keiretsu. 
The vertical  keiretsu  get a significant  coefficient  with a negative  sign, 
indicating  that imports  are unusually  low in keiretsu-dominated  indus- 
tries. If the vertical  keiretsu  operated  only by improving  efficiency, this 
would show up in both decreased imports and increased exports.36 
However, the regressions  in the 1987  study allowed for relative export 
performance  in the industry.  The  D variables  in equations  1  and  2 above 
measure  the degree to which Japanese imports  are low in an industry 
after  allowing  for the efficiency  of that  industry  as measured  by its export 
performance.  Thus, some part of the negative impact of the vertical 
keiretsu  on imports  results  not from  improved  efficiency, but  from  their 
discrimination  against  outsiders.  37 
The import  results  could reflect  collusive behavior  by keiretsu  firms, 
though  an intricate  conspiracy  theory is not necessarily at the heart  of 
these practices. Nor is it necessary to believe that keiretsu  firms  refuse 
to deal with outsiders  and are unresponsive  to price differences.  There 
could be discrimination  against  imports  simply  if, everything  else being 
equal, keiretsu members  prefer to buy from other keiretsu members. 
Discrimination  need not be absolute. Buyers may prefer to deal with 
some sellers but could still be induced by lower prices to deal with 
others.38  Strong keiretsu relationships, acting like tariffs rather than 
quotas, could reduce imports  but not reduce marginal  price elasticity. 
That is why the evidence that Japanese  trade has responded  to recent 
36. This is the case unless foreign  protectionist  actions were systematically  directed 
against  exports  in which  K, is high. 
37. The vertical keiretsu have particularly  high shares in the sales of electrical 
machinery  (43 percent)  and transport  machinery  (64 percent).  It is striking  that  Takeuchi 
(1990)  found that these were the industries  in which virtually  all Japanese  imports  from 
Asian countries  were imports  by Japanese  firms  from  their  foreign  affiliates.  For further 
discussion  see Lawrence  (1990a,  1991). 
38. Consider  a Cobb-Douglas  utility  function  where  log U = a, log X + (1 -  a,) log 
Y,  where  X equals  goods  bought  from  fellow keiretsu  members  and Yequals  goods  bought 
from  nonmembers.  If a, is greater  than  0.5, all else held  equal, keiretsu  goods will have a 
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changes  in  exchange  rates  may  refute  charges  of absolute  discrimination, 
but not charges  that  tariff-like  barriers  exist.39 
The Distribution Sector Dilemma 
The evidence thus far has focused on manufacturers.  Yet, the S1 
talks were also concerned  with the Japanese  distribution  system, and  in 
this sector too keiretsu  relationships  play some role. Several manufac- 
turers  have organized  their  own distribution  keiretsu  in which retail  and 
wholesale outlets are linked in a number  of ways. In particular,  these 
keiretsu are involved in the distribution of  electronics, cosmetics, 
pharmaceuticals,  cameras, and newspapers.40 The performance  of the 
Japanese  system, not only with respect to the role played by keiretsu, 
has come under  considerable  scrutiny. 
Some studies have found that the share of the final prices of goods 
accounted  for by the wholesale and retail  trade  sectors in Japan  (that  is, 
the distribution  margin)  is similar to those in other countries.4'  This 
finding  has been interpreted  as indicating  that the Japanese  distribution 
system is as efficient as those in other countries.42  Accordingly, some 
have resisted efforts to intensify the policing of this sector. In fact, 
though, the OECD has estimated that output per worker in Japanese 
distribution  was 72 percent of the U.S.  level.43  Thus, similar price 
margins  by percentage  do not necessarily imply similar  absolute costs. 
If final  goods prices are then higher  in Japan  than in other countries, as 
most purchasing-power  parity estimates suggest, Japanese  consumers 
will pay more  for distribution  services. 
The evidence on whether  the prices of Japanese  exportable  goods are 
more expensive in Japan  than abroad  is, however, mixed. As might  be 
expected, prices are sensitive to the level of the prevailing  exchange 
39. See Lawrence  (1990b). 
40. See Shibayama  and  Kiji  (1990)  and  Ishida  (1983). 
41. See Ito and  Maruyama  (1989)  and  Lawrence  (1989). 
42. Komiya  and Irie (1990, pp. 95, 97) argue  that Japanese  margins  are the same as 
those in the United  States. They also argue  that  Japanese  retail  prices  are unusually  high 
compared  with  those in the United  States because  the strong  yen has increased  yen costs 
in wholesale and retail services. It is surely contradictory  to hold both these positions 
simultaneously. 
43. Organization  for Economic  Cooperation  and  Development  (1988,  p. 81). 326  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
rate.  Yet there  is overwhelming  evidence that  foreign  goods, particularly 
consumer  goods with brand  names, are more  expensive in Japan  than  in 
other  countries.  In 1989  the Ministry  of International  Trade  and  Industry 
(MITI)  reported  a survey that  found  the prices of brand  name  consumer 
goods in New York and Dusseldorf to be 62 and 73 percent of those 
prices in Japan.44  In addition, European  goods are more expensive in 
Japan than in the United States. Apparently  the margins applied to 
foreign  goods in Japan  are unusually  high  by international  standards. 
William  Cline argues that these prices reflect the choice by foreign 
firms  to sell their  products  at high  prices and low volumes.45  He further 
maintains that "these conditions are not imposed by the Japanese 
government,  nor (except in the possible case of the distribution  system) 
by Japanese  firms;  and 'reform'  of these conditions could lower U.S. 
and other  foreign  firms'  profits  in the Japanese  market  (and  U.S . export 
earnings)."46  Japanese authorities  could face another tough dilemma. 
Efforts  to make  the distribution  of foreign  goods more  competitive  could 
hurt  precisely those foreign  firms  that have taken the trouble  to sell in 
Japan.  By lowering  the profits  of these firms,  the Japanese  government 
might  actually  aggravate  the foreign  trade  balance. 
In fact, foreign firms play a remarkably  small role in the selling of 
their products in Japan, and the evidence below indicates that they 
typically receive only world market  prices for their products. Most of 
the rents from foreign products are earned by Japanese distributors. 
Thus the beneficiaries  of increased competition  in the Japanese  distri- 
bution  system would  be Japanese  consumers  and  foreign  exporters. 
Distributor Nationality 
The U.S. Department  of Commerce  has conducted surveys of inter- 
national intrafirm  trade-firms  headed by the same parent company 
exporting  and importing  their  products  to and from one another.  These 
government  surveys  suggest  that  Japanese  firms  dominate  U.S. intrafirm 
exports  to Japan.  By contrast,  U. S. firms  dominate  U. S. intrafirm  exports 
to Europe, and European  firms  dominate  European  intrafirm  exports to 
44. Reported  in Nihon Keizai  Shimbun,  March  27, 1989. 
45. Cline  (1990). 
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the United States. Even though  the Japanese  share  has been declining, 
in 1988  Japanese  affiliates  in the United States still shipped  around  36 
percent  of their  exports  to Japan  back  to their  parent  companies  (mainly 
trading  companies).  Indeed U.S. affiliates  in Japan  imported  from  their 
parent  companies  only 17  percent  of all  Japanese  imports  from  the United 
States.47  Since these numbers  omit the value of U.S. exports sold to 
unaffiliated  Japanese  distributors,  they understate  the role of Japanese 
distributors  in selling  U.S. products. 
Price Evidence 
Unit-value trade data also help illuminate  the issue of distribution 
efficiency and world trading  prices. I randomly  selected a sample  of 40 
three-digit,  SIC-code export unit values for U.S. exports to Germany 
and  Japan  in 1987  and  for German  exports  to the United  States  and  Japan 
in the same year. An average  of these data, weighted  by export values, 
indicates  that  American  goods were almost  identically  priced  when sold 
to either  Germany  or Japan.  Similarly  the average  unit  value of German 
goods exported  to Japan  was  just 14  percent  higher  than  the average  unit 
value sold to the United  States. This suggests  that  by and  large  exporters 
are not charging  higher  prices when selling to Japan. Yet the surveys 
find  that  at the retail  level these goods are more  expensive in Japan  than 
in the United States or Germany. 
Indeed, in the 81  talks, a joint survey of the U.S.  and Japanese 
governments  again found that most foreign products  were much more 
expensive in Japan  than they were in the United States. As reported  in 
table 4, when weighted by export values the consumer goods in the 
survey  were almost  twice as expensive in Japan  as in the United States. 
Yet the unit-value  data indicate that the weighted average of the unit 
values of these products  when sold to Japan  was only 17  percent  higher 
than  when sold to Germany.  Unit-value  data  are subject  to mix effects, 
however, and the direction  of the bias is not obvious. If this preliminary 
evidence  is confirmed  by more  extensive surveys, it suggests  that  Cline's 
47. In 1986,  Japanese  foreign affiliates  shipped  over 58 percent of U.S. exports to 
Japan,  while U.S. affiliates  in Japan  imported  only 13 percent  of U.S. exports to Japan. 
As I show in Lawrence  (1989),  commodity  mix does not explain  these differences. 328  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1991 
Table 4.  Unit Values and Price Data for Selected U.S.  Exports to Japan 
and Germany, 1989 
Unit value 
of  U.S.  exports  Unit value  Retail price 
(dollars per unit)  ratio,  ratio, 
Item  To Japan  To Germany  Japan/Germany  Japan/U.S. 
Spark  plugs  9.0  6.3  1.43  2.49 
Electric shavers  18.2  10.6  1.72  2.00 
Calculators  (with batteries)  55.8  70.5  0.79  1.70 
Color  film, 16-35 mm  10.2  5.1  2.01  0.87 
Prepared  cereal  1.7  1.8  0.91  1.79 
Filled chocolate  3.8  2.5  1.50  1.63 
Jams and fruit  jelly  1.7  1.3  1.38  1.26 
Liquora  3.0  2.5  1.19  2.79 
Men's denim pants  66.5  69.9  0.95  1.74 
Pens  27.6  36.6  0.75  2.23 
Perfumes  3.4  14.3  0.24  1.35 
Golf clubs  34.0  28.8  1.18  1.94 
Golf balls  7.4  6.8  1.08  1.45 
Weighted  averageb  .  .  .  .  .  .  1.17  1.99 
Sources:  Unit  value  data from the  U.S.  Department  of Commerce,  reported in the trade data base.  Retail  price 
ratio from the Joint Price Survey  by MITI and U.S.  Department of Commerce. 
a.  Whiskey,  bourbon,  rum, and vodka are included  in the liquor category.  The  retail price ratio for liquor is the 
average of the figures for these  four types  of alcohol. 
b.  The value of U.S.  exports  to Japan for each item was used to calculate  the weighted  average of the unit value 
and retail price ratios. 
conclusions  should  be reversed.  Efforts  to reduce  the prices of imported 
products  in  Japan  by reducing  distribution  margins  would  have  a positive 
impact on import  volumes and would not, on balance, hurt  foreigners 
who are exporting  to Japan. 
Conclusions  and Policy Implications 
The cross-industry  regression  analysis presented  here indicates  that 
both vertical  and horizontal  keiretsu  relationships  tend to reduce Japa- 
nese imports. Horizontal keiretsu are not associated with a positive 
impact on export performance.  Accordingly, their apparent  impact is 
primarily  through  inhibiting  entry rather  than improving  competitive- 
ness. There  is some evidence that  vertical  keiretsu  do boost exports and 
that the impact  of vertical keiretsu  in reducing  imports  has diminished 
recently  (although  neither  effect is statistically  significant). Robert  Z. Lawrence  329 
The  evidence  here  provides  further  support  for  those who have argued 
that  Japan's  trade  structure  is distinctive. Rather  than simply  testing to 
see if Japan  is different, this paper shows that there is a relationship 
between Japanese industries with unusually low imports by OECD 
standards  and those in which vertical  keiretsu  predominate.  Moreover, 
this effect cannot simply  be explained  on the grounds  of efficiency  gains 
from  the presence of vertical  groups.  Finally,  the evidence suggests  that 
by and  large  Japanese  distributors,  as opposed to foreign  firms  conduct- 
ing their own distribution  in Japan, apply unusually high markups  to 
foreign  products  sold in Japan. 
Some may see this evidence as thinly veiled support  for managed 
trade. But such an approach  is likely to strengthen  cartel-like  behavior 
and have numerous,  unintended  side effects.48  Still others may object 
that keiretsu  practices are not a legitimate  topic for international  nego- 
tiation since they reflect private practices rather  than public  policy.49 
But in all countries,  the government  assumes responsibility  for policing 
private  commercial  behavior. In the 81  agreement,  both the U.S. and 
Japanese  governments  implicitly  accepted the notion that competition 
policy should, in fact, be a topic for international  negotiation. 
While  antitrust  violations should  be punished,  there are cases where 
keiretsu  relationships  improve  efficiency. As might  be expected, these 
efficiencies tend to be associated with vertical rather  than horizontal 
linkages. Given the complexity and pervasiveness of the vertical kei- 
retsu, it is difficult  to support extreme approaches that would either 
entirely ban these linkages or unreservedly tolerate them. Instead, 
vigilance and a  "rule of  reason" approach, which pays particular 
attention to horizontal  linkages, seems most appropriate.  There is no 
substitute  for an intensive investigation  of these practices  to determine 
in what ways they should  be emulated  and in what ways they should  be 
discouraged.  There is strong  evidence that policy should move beyond 
benign  neglect. 
This recommendation  also holds for the case of the distribution 
system. The Japanese FTC has defended the granting  of sole import 
licenses and the restrictions on certain forms of parallel imports by 
arguing  that these practices  facilitate  the entry of foreign  products  into 
48. For  a more  complete  discussion,  see Lawrence  and  Schultze  (1990),  especially  the 
paper  by Laura  D'Andrea  Tyson and  the comments  by Avinash  Dixit. 
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Japan.  Economic theory, however, suggests otherwise. It predicts  that 
a monopolist  acting rationally  will apply a markup  that is a function of 
the demand elasticity. If the demand for foreign products is seen as 
inelastic, markups  will be high  and import  volumes will be low. As long 
as this monopoly can be enforced, Japanese consumers and foreign 
exporters  will suffer  the costs. Indeed, a distribution  system with high 
markups  on foreign  goods is the private  sector equivalent  of high  tariffs. 
The distributors  rather  than  the government  collect the revenue. In light 
of this evidence, efforts to increase the channels for foreign entry into 
Japanese  distribution  are not misplaced. Comments 
and Discussion 
Gary  R. Saxonhouse: In the continuing  debate  over Japan's  distinctive 
trade  structure  there is an understandable  tendency to want to use one 
unique  feature of the Japanese  economy to explain some other unique 
features  of Japan's  economic performance.  In one important  example, 
imported  manufactured  goods continue to play a small role within the 
Japanese  economy, even though  formal  barriers  against  them are very 
low. In the search  for other  informal  barriers  that  might  account  for this 
low level of manufactured  imports,  it is not at all surprising  that  attention 
might finally alight on Japan's distinctive corporate groupings, the 
keiretsu. 
In thinking  about the issues Robert  Lawrence  raises, it is important 
to remember  that  for all their  distinctive  characteristics  there  is nothing 
illegal  about keiretsu  (in either  their  vertical  or horizontal  guises) under 
current  U.S. law. It is also important  to remember,  though, that under 
U.S.  antitrust statutes, collusive activities by foreign competitors in 
foreign markets, to the extent that they have an important  impact on 
U.S. commerce, can be prosecuted under existing legislation in U.S. 
courts. At least one major  case of this kind,  Zenith  Radio Corp.  et al. v. 
Matsushita  Electrical  Industrial  Co.  et al.,  has been  brought against 
Japanese  firms  in the U.S. courts during  the past fifteen  years. 
The model  Lawrence  estimates  is not presented  as part  of his analysis 
but is taken from previous work by Peter Petri. Petri's model assumes 
factor-price equalization across industries. This might look like an 
entirely  conventional  assumption,  but the reality  is otherwise. There is 
considerable  empirical  work indicating  that intersectoral  factor-price 
differences-in particular,  intersectoral  wage differences-can  be large 
and can persist over time and over space.  I While  the character  of these 
1. Katz  and  Summers  (1989). 
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wage differentials  is much debated  in the United States, it is clear they 
also exist and persist in Japan.  They also appear  to be correlated  with 
the presence or absence of keiretsu. 
Wage  differentials  are not the only long-standing  intersectoral  factor- 
price  differentials  in Japan  that  are  correlated  with  keiretsu.  Historically 
speaking, keiretsu, particularly  the so-called horizontal keiretsu, are 
about nothing  if they are not about cost-of-capital  differentials.  While 
wage  differentials  are  positively  correlated  with  the presence  of keiretsu, 
cost-of-capital differentials  are negatively correlated. Because factor 
intensity, in effect, enters Lawrence's export and import  regressions 
normalized  relative to labor, these differentials,  rather  than canceling 
out, actually magnify each other. Overall, these specification errors 
could be highly negatively correlated  with the keiretsu variables, and 
they might  easily impart  considerable  negative  bias when the coefficient 
on the keiretsu  variable  is estimated. 
Assuming  factor  prices  constant  is not the only specification  problem 
with  this model.  To mentionjust  one more,  Lawrence  implicitly  assumes 
that  the substitution  elasticity  between  domestic  production  and  imports 
is the same across all industries. This assumption  is at variance with 
most  notions  of comparative  advantage.  Once  again,  the error  associated 
with this assumption  is likely to be correlated  with the right-hand-side 
variables  used in this analysis. 
There  are  problems  more  fundamental  with Lawrence's  analysis  than 
just specification  error.  Lawrence  gets off on the wrong  track  when he 
chooses to use a cross-industry  model of trade structure  to study the 
impact of keiretsu. Looking only at the relative trade performance  of 
Japanese  industries  cannot yield any inference  about whether  Japan  or 
even any Japanese  industry  is importing  too little or too much  from the 
perspective of global welfare. This is a point that Petri, among  others, 
has made when using this model. The relative performances  of all the 
Japanese  sectors are  jointly determined.  Lawrence  has no independent 
observations  in his sample  at all. In addition,  most of Lawrence's  right- 
hand-side variables  are determined  simultaneously  with trade perfor- 
mance. 
The finding  of a negative association of the keiretsu variable with 
import  levels may indicate  little except that this is the mechanism  that 
Japan  uses to reach the prescribed  level of imports. To take a simple 
example, comparative advantage might dictate whether a Japanese Robert  Z. Lawrence  333 
assembler will use a local supplier or whether components will be 
imported.  By Lawrence's  definitions,  keiretsu  include  vertical  relation- 
ships. If comparative  advantage  results in an assembler  using domestic 
suppliers,  by the definitions  Lawrence  is using, the assembler  will be at 
the center of a keiretsu.  By contrast, if comparative  advantage  dictates 
that an assembler  use imported  supplies, a vertical keiretsu  is unlikely 
to appear.  In this example, keiretsu, rather  than interfering  with com- 
parative  advantage,  are actually  defined  by it. This is the way Japan  gets 
to import the right amount. And this right amount is defined not by 
Japanese  monopoly  power, but by global  welfare. 
Lawrence  thinks  there  may  be an antitrust  issue here not  just because 
keiretsu  might be import  inhibiting  but because they might be import 
inhibiting  without being export promoting. If keiretsu are primarily 
devices to improve  efficiency and improve  both Japanese  welfare and 
global  welfare, the strong  negative  association  with imports  ought  to be 
complemented  by a strong  positive association with exports. Unfortu- 
nately, foreign barriers  against Japanese exports, particularly  against 
exports of such keiretsu-dominated  industries  as automobiles  and steel, 
make overseas performance  a flawed standard. This same problem 
dogged  Lawrence's earlier  work on import  behavior.2  Moreover, 1985, 
the year Lawrence  uses for his analysis, is probably  just when the mid- 
1980s undervaluation  of yen combined with widespread quantitative 
restraints  on Japanese  exports to diminish  the differentials  in overseas 
performance  among  Japanese  industries.  The efficiency-promoting  con- 
sequences of keiretsu  may be masked  so that even if the import  side of 
his analysis were correct Lawrence might still wrongly conclude that 
there  is a significant  antitrust  issue at stake here. 
Many economists in Japan, as Lawrence has noted, get frustrated 
with analyses of this sort because they doubt keiretsu are a serious 
analytical  category.  There  is merit  in  this  criticism.  Definitions  of keiretsu 
do vary so widely that it is often difficult  to say who is in and  who is out 
of a keiretsu.  The Dodwell classification  that Lawrence  uses is just one 
of a number  of keiretsu  classification  systems available  from Japanese 
sources. These sources can differ  widely, and any particular  classifica- 
tory scheme may not be consistent over time. According  to Lawrence, 
the 1986  edition  of Dodwell classifies firms  according  to membership  in 
2. Saxonhouse  (1989). 334  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
17 major keiretsu. Just three years later, in 1989, Dodwell redefines 
whole  new industries  as keiretsu  dominated  and  finds  that  suddenly  there 
are no fewer than  47 major  keiretsu.  By contrast, the Toyo Keizai data 
bank  lists 46 keiretsu  for 1989,  but only 23 of these keiretsu  overlap  with 
the Dodwell keiretsu.3 
Quite apart  from arbitrary  classification,  Japanese firms do change 
their  affiliations  far  more  frequently  than  is generally  believed. Between 
the mid-1970s  and the early 1980s  no less than 25 percent of the firms 
listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange changed  their 
main  bank  affiliation.4  With  the growth  of equity financing  and with the 
equalizing  of the terms of access to capital between keiretsu  and non- 
keiretsu  firms, one of the main props of the keiretsu  system is coming 
undone. An acceleration  of keiretsu  hopping  and disaffiliation  can be 
expected in the future. 
In response to conceptual  criticism  of his cross-industrial  analysis  of 
Japanese  import  behavior,  Lawrence  has  also  attempted  to study  keiretsu 
influence  with a cross-national  model. In this effort, Lawrence  takes the 
estimated  coefficients  on Japanese  dummy  variables  from  his 1987  model 
of cross-national  import  performance  and  regresses  them  on his keiretsu 
variables.5  While setting  his analysis in a cross-national  context clearly 
makes sense, there are special problems here. In Lawrence's 1987 
model, Japanese sectoral export shares are said to explain Japanese 
sectoral import shares. This is highly improbable.  Sectoral shares of 
imports  and  exports  are  almost  certainly  simultaneously  determined  and 
Lawrence's  estimated  coefficients  are almost  certainly  biased. The new 
use of these estimated coefficients as observations on a dependent 
variable  in a regression,  however, compounds  simultaneity  with heter- 
oscedasticity.6  In consequence, Lawrence's estimates of his keiretsu 
coefficients  will be inefficient  and  the statistical  tests he presents  will be 
biased toward rejecting  the hypothesis that his estimated coefficients 
are insignificantly  different  from  zero. 
The simultaneity  problem  in Lawrence's 1987  paper  is not difficult  to 
resolve. The  Helpman-Krugman  model  which  inspired  Lawrence's  work 
can be solved such that  national  differences  in import  shares  and  export 
3. Toyo Keizai  Shinposha  (1989). 
4.  Horiuchi,  Packer,  and  Fukuda  (1988). 
5.  Lawrence  (1987). 
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shares can both be explained by national  differences in factor endow- 
ments. When  the residuals  from  this estimated  reduced-form  version of 
the Helpman-Krugman  model  are  regressed  on Lawrence-style  horizon- 
tal and vertical keiretsu  variables  for the eighteen industries  for which 
comparable  data are available, a new picture  emerges.7  The estimated 
coefficients  on the keiretsu  variables  are both negative. The horizontal 
keiretsu  is significantly  different  from zero, however, only at the 65.3 
percent level, while the vertical keiretsu  is significantly  different  from 
zero only at the 54.2 percent  level. Neither result provides any support 
for the view that  keiretsu  are distorting  Japanese  trade  structure. 
In the final substantive section of this paper, Lawrence looks at 
Japan's  distribution  system and  finds  that  Japanese  distributors  and  not 
American producers appear to be responsible for the relatively high 
retail  prices of goods in Japan.  While  price  surveys  are  ambiguous  about 
whether  there is much  of a price differential  between Japanese  goods at 
home and abroad,  the results on American  goods are clear. The prices 
of American  goods are much  higher  in Japan  than in the United States. 
At the same time, the unit values of their shipments  to Japan  are only 
slightly  higher  than  the unit  values of their  shipments  to Germany.  From 
this Lawrence concludes that Japanese  distributors,  while not making 
excess returns  on Japanese-made  goods, do earn substantial  rents on 
their  distribution  of American  goods. Before Lawrence  can draw  such a 
conclusion, he must assume that American  companies have no direct 
role in the Japanese  distribution  of the rather  special products  included 
in these price surveys. One missing  piece of evidence also needs to be 
examined.  What  is the level of retail  prices of representative  U.S. goods 
in Germany?  If retail prices of representative  U.S. goods in Germany 
approach  Japanese  levels, American  producers,  and not Japanese  dis- 
tributors,  may yet be collecting substantial  rents. 
Notwithstanding  the absence of a full complement of comparable 
German  price data, most economists in Japan and the United States 
would not be particularly  surprised  to find  that the historical  barriers  to 
entry  into the Japanese  distribution  sector have had some impact  on the 
prices of foreign products in Japan. In this connection, U.S.  strategy 
during  the first  round  of the Structural  Impediments  Initiative  (SII)  talks 
should  be recalled.  There  was a clear  decision to make  the liberalization 
7.  Saxonhouse  (1989). 336  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
of Japan's distribution  system, through the reform of Japan's Large 
Scale Retail  Store Law, the first  American  priority.  Part  of this decision 
was due  to the relative  complexity  of the distribution  sector  issues versus 
keiretsu  issues. There  was also, however, a more systematic  rationale. 
Much of the political energy behind the keiretsu  issues seems con- 
cerned with vertical keiretsu.  The vast majority  of the keiretsu-related 
anecdotes  are  about  discriminatory  vertical  relationships.  In  economics, 
there  is a vast analytical  literature  on vertical  relationships.8  It is difficult 
to summarize  all this work, but two broad  conclusions are instructive. 
First, it is widely recognized  that many  discriminatory  vertical  relation- 
ships, which otherwise might run afoul of U.S. antitrust  statutes, are 
considered innocuous if practiced between two entities that are fully 
vertically integrated with each other. The level  of  formal vertical 
integration  in the United States is much higher  than the level of formal 
vertical integration  in Japan. For example, General Motors buys 45 
percent  of its components  from  outside suppliers  compared  with Toyo- 
ta's  outside purchases of  more than 75 percent.9 Is  it really very 
interesting  for U.S. and Japanese  trade  negotiators  to be arguing  about 
practices that could be resolved legally with simply more vertical 
integration  in Japan?  Why is formal vertical integration  in the United 
States better  than  informal  vertical  integration  in Japan? 
The second pertinent  finding  in the economic literature  is the widely 
accepted rule of reason  that you do not worry  too much  about  discrimi- 
natory vertical relationships, provided that the vertical relationship 
operates  in a market  that  is highly  contestable. From  this perspective, if 
the 81  deals successfully with the deregulation  of Japan's  distribution 
system and if final goods markets  in Japan  become truly competitive, 
then keiretsu relationships should cease to be a source of economic 
distortion. If Japanese firms wish to handicap themselves by using 
inefficient suppliers, what foreign firms lose  in intermediate goods 
markets can be made up in final goods markets. Since it is widely 
accepted  that  the Bush  administration  has  made  great  progress  in  opening 
up Japan's  distribution  sector in the past year, perhaps  it is possible to 
hope that  keiretsu  may well be an issue whose time is already  past. 
8. Perry  (1989). 
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General Discussion 
Robert Lawrence responded  to some of Saxonhouse's criticisms  of 
bias in the paper's  results. He did not understand  why the higher  wages 
and  lower capital  costs that Saxonhouse  associated  with keiretsu  would 
not have opposite effects on imports,  making  any net bias in the import 
equation  unclear.  Nor did he see why the assumption  of similar  substi- 
tution  elasticities  across industries  should  bias  the results  toward  finding 
a relationship  between  keiretsu  and  imports.  And  he argued  that  although 
the Dodwell classifications  of group members  could change with time 
and differ  from  other classifications,  this did not imply  bias in using the 
measure  in the paper. Furthermore,  the aggregate  measure  of sales by 
all keiretsu members, which is the variable used in the regressions, 
should be relatively invariant  to changes in the keiretsu  association of 
individual  firms. 
Some panelists  discussed  the findings  of the paper  from  the viewpoint 
of U.S. trade  policy and antitrust  policy. William  Nordhaus  noted that 
the regression  equations 1 and 2, which allowed  indirectly  for efficiency 
effects, showed that  only the vertical  keiretsu  restrict  Japanese  imports. 
This implied  that U.S. trade  policy aimed  at increasing  exports to Japan 
should  go after the behavior  of vertical  rather  than  horizontal  keiretsu. 
Robert  Litan  observed that such a policy would run  contrary  to current 
antitrust  practices in the United States, where little attention  is being 
paid  to vertical  mergers.  Steven Salop disagreed  with this characteriza- 
tion of antitrust  policy, noting that more recently antitrust  economists 
and  lawyers  have become  increasingly  concerned  with  vertical  restraints 
on trade, especially where they are accompanied by horizontal re- 
straints. As vertical and horizontal keiretsu often coexist, there was 
probable  cause for antitrust  concerns. Lawrence observed that if anti- 
trust policy was concerned about efficiency, it should look closely at 
horizontal keiretsu which, according to  his findings, might lead to 
discrimination  against  foreign  goods while not increasing  efficiency. 
The panelists discussed some ambiguities  in the empirical  results. 
Nordhaus  noted that horizontal  concentration  increased  imports  while 
horizontal  keiretsu  reduced them. He also noted that the cross-OECD 
regressions  gave opposite results from  the domestic regressions  for the 
effects of horizontal  keiretsu  on imports. William  Brainard  noted that 338  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
tariffs had a positive coefficient in the import  equations. Salop found 
inconsistencies between the import  and export equations. He felt that 
many  of the variables,  such  as producer  concentration  and  technological 
intensity,  which  he expected to have opposite  signs  in the two equations, 
actually had the same sign. Nordhaus reasoned that many of these 
inconsistencies  could be resolved by the fact that almost  all of the right- 
hand-side  variables  in  the regressions  were  endogenous.  Brainard  agreed 
that  endogeneity  could explain  the sign on the tariff  variables  and  added 
that  the existence of keiretsu  could also possibly be endogenous. Nord- 
haus suggested  that, in light of the empirical  uncertainties,  it would be 
desirable  to spell out the mechanisms  by which the apparent  keiretsu 
effects were taking  place, using industrial  organization  theory. 
Richard  Cooper emphasized  that the results should not be misinter- 
preted  to say that keiretsu  are the source of the Japanese  trade surplus 
with the United States. Showing  that keiretsu  reduce certain  imports  is 
insufficient  to account  for the trade  surplus,  as the overall  trade  balance 
is determined  by the level of aggregate  saving  and investment. Because 
of the large  amount  of non-keiretsu  imports,  they may  not even decrease 
the overall level of imports. Cooper also noted that consumer goods 
make up a relatively small part of U.S. exports, so that the evidence 
from retail prices was not very helpful in understanding  the overall 
trading  relationship. Robert  Z. Lawrence  339 
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